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The civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in 1992–1995 has drawn the attention 
of many Western politicians, diplomats, 
historians, sociologists, political scientists 
and journalists:  they have tried to of-
fer some answers to many controversies 
burdening the history of this part of the 
Balkans. Two monographs reviewed here, 
one co-authored by Robert J. Donia and 
John V. A. Fine, the other written by Do-
nia, attract attention for at least two rea-
sons: 1) both offer a number of quite bold 
theoretical propositions, although most 
of these, and this is an understatement, 
are historically unfounded, inadequately 
defined in scholarly terms and not to 
difficult to disprove; 2) the propositions 
offered emanate clear political messages, 
which suggests that the authors’ motives 
may have been other than scholarly.
The central thesis of the co-authored 
book on a “tradition betrayed” is that ever 
since the creation of the medieval Bosnian 
state, Bosnia has been inhabited by a re-
ligiously mixed population calling them-
selves Bosnians regardless of their differ-
ent religious allegiances. This population, 
the authors claim, belonged to the Ortho-
dox Christian, Roman Catholic and Bos-
nian churches and never saw themselves 
as Serbs or Croats. They mixed with one 
another and converted from one religion 
to another, but that did not affect their 
ethnic or regional self-identification. The 
ethnic terms Serb and Croat, the authors 
claim, were completely unknown in Bos-
nia until the modern age, more precisely 
until the second half of the nineteenth 
century, when they were imported into 
Bosnia and Herzegovina under the influ-
ence of nationalist propagandas from two 
neighbouring lands, Serbia and Croatia. 
It was then that the Orthodox Christians 
began to refer to themselves as Serbs, the 
Roman Catholics as Croats, while the 
tradition of the Bosnian name was only 
maintained by the population that had 
converted to Islam under Ottoman rule. 
The authors challenge what was taken 
as an axiom in Yugoslav historiography 
and particularly popular among Muslim-
Bosniak intellectuals. The axiom in ques-
tion consisted of three widely accepted 
but as yet unverified theses: 1) the Bosnian 
Church was Bogomil; 2) most of Bos-
nia’s population belonged to the Bosnian 
Church; 3) most of Bosnia’s population 
converted to Islam to evade the violence 
that the Roman Catholic Franciscan or-
der and the last Catholic kings of Bosnia 
used against the local non-Catholic popu-
lation. The authors claim that the Bosnian 
Church was neither Bogomil nor Patarin 
nor neo-Manichaean, but a distinct reli-
gious organization accepting the belief in 
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one God, the Trinity, the cross, the cult 
of the saints, and religious images. They 
also claim that the adherents of the Bos-
nian Church were not a majority; on the 
contrary, they were not many and, conse-
quently, their religious or political influ-
ence was much weaker than that of the 
Catholic and Orthodox Christians. Final-
ly, the authors question the thesis about 
the adherents of the Bosnian Church 
converting to Islam in consequence of the 
hostile attitude of the Catholic Church 
and the Bosnian Catholic kings, and ar-
gue instead that they also used to convert 
to Orthodoxy and Catholicism, just as 
one Christian group used to convert to 
another and to Islam.
In keeping with this line of thinking, 
the history of medieval Bosnia is shown 
as completely independent from the his-
tories of other medieval states, such as 
Serbia, Byzantium, Hungary and the Ra-
gusan Republic (Dubrovnik), the purpose 
being to suggest that we are dealing with 
a tradition and culture in its own right, a 
distinctive entity which can be justifiably 
viewed independently of its neighbour-
hood. The authors make a selection of 
quotations in order to prove that Bosnia 
has always been a harmonious and toler-
ant multicultural and multireligious envi-
ronment with no tradition of drastic and 
systematic discrimination on the grounds 
of religion or culture, a harmony to a large 
extent inspired by the legacy of Ottoman 
culture and, especially, by the period of 
Austro-Hungarian rule 1878–1918. All 
major rebellions, upheavals and wars, such 
as the rebellion against Ottoman rule in 
Herzegovina in 1875, outbursts of anti-
Serbian violence after the assassination 
of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, 
atrocities under the Croat fascist Ustachi 
regime 1941–1945 and, finally, the tragic 
civil war 1992–1995 were, in their view, 
an exception. Multiethnic harmony is a 
rule, the instances of strife and intoler-
ance are exceptions instigated by Serbia 
and Croatia.  
It follows, therefore, that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is not an artificial creation, 
as it is described by “Serbian and Croatian 
nationalists”; but rather, it has a cultural 
identity of its own, centuries-old and ut-
terly different from those of Serbia and 
Croatia. The term “Bosnian” is a generic 
one (regional rather than ethnic, though) 
and all inhabitants of Bosnia can readily 
identify themselves with it regardless of 
their religious or ethnic affiliations: Mus-
lim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs, Catholic 
Croats, Jews and everybody else.        
These claims need to be examined in 
order to see how fact-based they are.
For example, is the assertion correct 
that the terms Serb and Croat do not oc-
cur in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the 
second half of the nineteenth century?
The earliest surviving medieval refer-
ence to a people in what now is Bosnia and 
Herzegovina found in historical sources 
is a reference to Serbs. According to the 
Byzantine scholar emperor Constantine 
VII Porphyrogenitus (905–959), in the 
ninth and tenth centuries Bosnia formed 
part of Serbian polities; it was only later 
divided into “unchristened Serbia” (i.e. 
Bosnia) and “christened Serbia” (Rascia). 
For the Roman Catholic Church the 
whole region was known as regnum Ser-
villiae quod est Bosnia (Kingdom of Serbia 
that is Bosnia). The surviving medieval 
agreements regulating the legal status of 
Ragusan merchants in case of their dis-
putes with subjects of Bosnia concluded 
in 1235, 1240 and 1249 between the ruler 
of Bosnia, ban Matija Ninoslav, and the 
Republic of Ragusa confirm the Serbian 
name for Bosnians, the same as fifteenth-
century documents, such as a donation 
charter of Juraj Vojsalić of 1434 (cf. F. 
Miklosich, Monumenta Serbica spectanta 
historiam Serbiae Bosnae Ragusii [Vindo-
bonae 1858]).
It should be emphasized that the 
most powerful ruler of medieval Bosnia 
Tvrtko, of the Kotromanić family (ban 
1353–1377; king 1377–1391), was Serb, 
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even if his entourage consisted of Roman 
Catholic priests. He was a female-line de-
scendent of the Nemanjićs: king Dragu-
tin of Serbia was his grand grandfather. 
As a matter of fact, Tvrtko’s kinship with 
the Nemanjićs and rule over a large por-
tion of the territory previously held by 
the Nemanjić dynasty was his basis for 
claiming the “double crown” (sugubi vi-
jenac) reuniting Serbia and Bosnia. Tvrtko 
was crowned “king of Serbs, Bosnia, the 
Littoral and the Western Parts” at the 
monastery of Mileševa in October 1377 
before the relics of St. Sava (Nemanjić), 
founder of the Autocephalous Serbian 
Orthodox Church. The coronation was 
performed according to the Orthodox 
rite, apparently by the metropolitan of 
Mileševa and with the knowledge of the 
patriarch of the Serbian Church. The use 
of the term “Serbs” (rather than Serbia) in 
Tvrtko’s title is a striking evidence of his 
ethnic affiliation, given that the rest of the 
title simply lists a string of regional ter-
ritorial names.1  
Not that the authors fail to mention 
all this. What they fail to mention is how 
king Tvrtko (and his successors as well) 
identified himself. They simply refer to 
him as a “Bosnian” who, by sheer force of 
circumstance, became a Serbian king. The 
ethnic term Serb has been known in Bos-
nia ever since its emergence as a feudal 
Christian state (as shown by the charters 
issued to Dubrovnik), while the term Bos-
nian denoted a regional, political, rather 
than ethnic allegiance (for more, see V. 
Ćorović, Historija Bosne, vol. I [Belgrade: 
SKA 1940]). It should also be noted that 
the name Herzegovina comes from the 
1 It is quite interesting that the Bos-
nian Muslims adopted in 1991 the pur-
ple coat of arms with golden fleurs-de-lis, 
originally the coat of arms of the Bosnian 
Serb Kotromanić family derived from the 
Nemanjić tradition. 
title “herzeg [duke] of St. Sava” borne 
by the Serbian magnate Stefan Vukčić 
Kosača, who ruled this area in the fif-
teenth century (S. Ćirković, Stefan Vukčić 
Kosača i njegovo doba [Belgrade: SANU, 
1964]). Throughout the medieval period, 
most of eastern Herzegovina, the native 
land of the Nemanjić dynasty, more often 
formed part of Rascia or Serbia than of 
Bosnia as a separate polity. 
It was only with the Austro-Hungari-
an occupation of Bosnia that attempts be-
gan to be made to promote this regional 
identity into an ethnic concept. That all 
such attempts failed is confirmed by the 
administrator of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Benjamin von Kállay’s abortive policy of 
promoting the idea of “a single Bosnian 
nation” comprising Muslim Bosnians, 
Orthodox Bosnians and Catholic Bos-
nians. Any attempt of the kind only ag-
gravated the situation and led to further 
divisions along ethnic and religious lines. 
Donia and Fine, however, argue that the 
term “Bosnian” has always functioned as 
a true melting-pot comparable with the 
similar mechanism in the USA. This ide-
ological construction with all elements of 
a political utopia gives the term “Bosnian” 
meanings that considerably deviate from 
their real historical context. The leading 
interwar British authority on the Bal-
kans, Robert W. Seton-Watson, described 
the population of Bosnia in the follow-
ing way: “In Herzegovina and Bosnia, to 
which the revolt [1875] speedily spread, 
unrest had been chronic since the begin-
ning of the [nineteenth] century. The two 
provinces have been hermetically sealed 
from the outside world ever since the fi-
nal Turkish conquest in 1483. Of purest 
Serbian blood, the population was divided 
between Moslem, Orthodox and Catho-
lic, the big feudal lords having in the first 
instance accepted Islam to save their 
lands and having imposed their new reli-
gion upon a certain section of their serfs” 
(R. W. Seton-Watson, Disreaeli, Gladstone 
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and the Eastern Question [London: Frank 
Cass, 1971], 17). Furthermore, the ex-
plicit goal of several insurrections against 
Ottoman rule in both Herzegovina and 
Bosnia during the nineteenth century was 
unification with two Serbian principali-
ties, Montenegro and Serbia: “Two peti-
tions signed by more than 1500 Bosnian 
Serb leaders and elders and sent to the 
Russian Emperor, the first on St Vitus 
Day (Vidovdan) which commemorates 
the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, the second in 
March 1878, during the closing phase of 
the Bosnian insurrection [1875–1878], 
stated that it was the ‘lasting desire… 
of the people [to become] a part of the 
Serbian principality’, stressing, among 
other things, the fact that the ‘inhabitants 
of these lands all speak Serbian’ ” (D. T. 
Bataković, The Serbs of Bosnia & Herze-
govina. History and Politics [Paris: Dia-
logue, 1996], 60).  
The Roman Catholic population in 
Bosnia was exposed to Croatization, most-
ly through the influence of the Catholic 
Church. According to the reports of the 
Austro-Hungarian agent and army officer 
Alfred Babic, the influence of Zagreb was 
not felt beyond Slavonski Brod. From 
Slavonski Brod, “both the Catholics and 
Eastern Orthodox only find the Serbian 
idea legitimate”. This was one of the rea-
sons precipitating the Austro-Hungarian 
occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Even so, the Croatization of the Catholic 
population ran at a slow pace. For exam-
ple, Stjepan Radić, a prominent interwar 
leader of the Croat Peasant Party, em-
phasized that out of 3,353 Catholics in 
Mostar (Herzegovina) registered by the 
census of 1895 only 250 were ethnically 
aware Croats. This number may be taken 
as indicative of the process of Croatization 
as a whole: 13.5 percent of the Catholic 
community in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(cf. analysis based on Austrian primary 
sources in T. Kraljačić, Kalajev režim u 
Bosni i Hercegovini 1882–1903 [Sarajevo 
1985]). Later the process was intensified, 
mostly through Franciscans activity, and 
eventually the entire Catholic population 
in Bosnia became Croat.  
The available historical documents 
show that Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
populated mostly by Christian Orthodox 
Serbs. It was under the influence of Ot-
toman cultural legacy, Austro-Hungarian 
actions and strong Catholic campaigning 
that they became divided into three sepa-
rate nations along religious lines: Bos-
niaks (Muslim), Croats (Catholic), and 
Serbs (Serbian population that resisted 
religious conversion remained Christian 
Orthodox). Therefore, due to shifting al-
liances and territories at different periods, 
the history of medieval Bosnia cannot be 
viewed in isolation from medieval Serbia. 
This was obvious even to eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century writers of history, and 
such an approach is observable in Franjo 
Ksaver Pejačević (Pejacsevich)’s Historia 
Serviae (1799), Johann Christian Engel’s 
Serbien und Bosnien (1801), Miklosich’s 
Monumenta Serbica (1858) or, finally, in 
Medo Pucić, a learned Ragusan aristo-
crat who published two volumes of me-
dieval documents from the Archives of 
Dubrovnik, including those relating to 
Bosnia, under the title Serbian Monu-
ments from 1395 to 1423 (1858 and 1862). 
All these examples clearly show that the 
medieval history of Bosnia and Serbia 
constitutes an indivisible whole and, con-
sequently, that Donia and Fine, by depict-
ing Serbia as an alien factor in relation 
to Bosnia, in fact perform their artificial 
separation.         
As for the origin of the Bosnian 
Church, its teachings and its influence 
on the political and everyday life of the 
inhabitants of Bosnia, one may say that it 
grew out of a heresy known as Bogomilism, 
which apparently originated in Bulgaria 
in the tenth century. It took root in Bos-
nia after its priesthood and adherents had 
been expulsed from Serbia under Stefan 
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Nemanja, and continued to develop there 
for another two centuries, and then began 
to decline and to lose significance because 
of both the activity of the Roman Catho-
lic and Serbian Orthodox churches, and 
the advancement of Islam. No significant 
traces of its activity have survived in Bos-
nia. The famous grave markers known as 
stećci, ascribed under Austro-Hungarian 
rule to the Bogomils, have been convinc-
ingly shown to be a local feature rather 
than a confessional marker.    
The authors insist that the Ottoman 
cultural legacy, the period of “Europe-
anization” under Austro-Hungarian rule 
1878–1918, and the socialist period un-
der the regime of Josip Broz Tito, simply 
firmed up the tradition of religious toler-
ance and multicultural society, the civi-
lized values forever cherished in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and occasionally dis-
rupted under the influence of belligerent 
nationalist propagandas from both Serbia 
and Croatia aimed at partitioning Bosnia. 
This calculated and far-fetched simpli-
fication is supposed to divert attention 
from the main causes of strife among the 
peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 
modern history of the Balkans. Historical 
facts suggest that ethnic tolerance was an 
appearance, a form of social mimicry con-
cealing mutual distrust, to which many 
political actions of the great powers have 
given a significant contribution. 
Every attempt to enforce a system 
favourable to only one of the ethnic-re-
ligious groups unfailingly led to a conflict 
verging on extermination among Bosnian 
Serbs, Croats and Muslims. Ever since 
the Ottoman conquest and the Islamiza-
tion of Bosnia, Bosnian society has been 
torn apart along religious and ethnic 
lines, while the appearance of unity has 
been maintained by an external supreme 
authority.2 That is how it was under Otto-
2 For additional information and interpre-
tations based on first-hand experience, see 
man and Austro-Hungarian occupation 
and under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 
and that is how it is now under the pa-
tronage of the UN and EU. In Bosnia, 
the centrifugal force of ethnic separation 
has always predominated over the cen-
tripetal force of politically forged unity. 
The supreme authority with almost un-
limited powers changed, but the structure 
of Bosnian society has remained more or 
less the same, heavily burdened by ethnic 
and religious divisions, social rivalries and 
distrust, of which the only Serbian No-
bel-prize laureate in literature Ivo Andrić 
wrote wittily, wisely and lucidly. Closing 
the eyes to the fact that the concept of a 
unitary Bosnia poses a serious threat to 
peace both in Bosnia and in the region, 
as it leads directly to Muslim dominance 
over Croats and Serbs, Donia and Fine 
blame the hegemonist policy of both Ser-
bia and Croatia for the civil war. But they 
fail to take three significant facts into ac-
count.
Firstly, still a federal unit within Yu-
goslavia in 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, according to its own Constitution, 
was not entitled to declare independence 
without the consent of all three constitu-
ent peoples; moreover, not even minimum 
requirements for international recogni-
tion were met, as observed by Christian 
Hillgruber in 1998: international “rec-
ognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not 
function merely as a refutable assumption 
that the criteria of statehood were met; 
it actually served as a substitute for these 
features, which were obviously missing” 
(quoted after R. Caplan, Europe and the 
Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia 
[Cambridge University Press, 2005]).
A. Barre, La Bosnie et Herzegovine. Admin-
istration autrichienne de 1878 à 1903 (Paris 
1904); cf. also Ehli-Islam, Bezakonja okupa-
cione uprave u Bosni i Hercegovini (Novi Sad 
1901), as well as P. M. Tomić, Pravoslavlje u 
Bosni i Hercegovini  (Belgrade 1898).  
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Secondly, the referendum on inde-
pendence was not legitimate, because 
only Muslim Bosniaks and Croats took 
part, while Serbs, reluctant to secede 
from Yugoslavia, boycotted it. This is to 
say that the referendum was boycotted by 
more than 36 percent of the population 
(Serbs and “Yugoslavs”). A stark example 
of illegitimate majority rule over an entire 
constituent nation, it practically opened 
the door to the civil war. In a state such 
as Bosnia and Herzegovina was in 1992, 
composed of three constituent nations, 
key decisions cannot be majority decisions 
but ought to be made by the consensus 
of the democratic representatives of all 
constituent nations. It was obvious even 
then that Muslim Bosniak and Croatian 
political leaders violated this rule.
Thirdly, the authors fail to mention 
that there was a plan which might have 
prevented the civil war, brokered by the 
Portuguese diplomat Cutileiro in Febru-
ary 1992. At first the plan was signed by 
the representatives of all three constituent 
nations, but at the end of the day Alija 
Izetbegović, the representative of Mus-
lim Bosniaks, rescinded his signature at 
the suggestion of the US ambassador to 
Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann (W. 
Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: 
Yugoslavia and its Destroyers–America’s 
Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and 
Why [Toronto: Random House, 1996], 
190–191).   
In conclusion, one can only say that 
Donia and Fine’s book has little scholarly 
value. It abounds in ideological theses 
and lacks the necessary in-depth analysis. 
Conceived as a brief historical account of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina understandable 
to the Western public, it in fact takes a 
biased stance in favour of the position and 
policy of the Muslim side in the lamenta-
ble conflict of 1992–1995.3  
3 For example, the very introduction to the 
book claims that on the eve of the war Serb 
The other book, devoted to Sarajevo 
and its history, was authored by Donia and 
published in 2006. Given almost identical 
conclusions and political messages, it is in 
fact a sequel to the book on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Just as the latter was sup-
posed to offer “scholarly” evidence for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina being an inherently 
harmonious society marked by a high lev-
el of interethnic and religious tolerance, 
this one aims to prove the same, but on 
the micro-level of a city, from the earliest 
historical reference to it in 1544 until its 
current situation in post-Dayton Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Although being a much 
better book than the earlier one, it paints 
an almost idyllic picture of the Bosnian 
capital. Its main thesis is that ever since 
its creation as a typical Turkish kassaba, 
Sarajevo has been open to all cultures and 
ethnic groups (Muslim Bosniaks, Serbs, 
Croats, Jews etc.), developing harmoni-
ous neighbourly relations and a distinc-
tive cultural identity so typical of the 
Bosnian mentality. However, Sarajevo’s 
society (and Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
a whole) has been multiethnic and har-
monious on the surface, while remaining 
divided along ethnic and religious lines in 
practice. In spite of what Donia and many 
other Western observers like to believe, 
that society has never developed into 
a Western-style civil one. Were Donia 
right, could Sarajevo under the pro-Nazi 
Independent State of Croatia have been 
the seat of the archbishop Šarić, a fervent 
clerical fascist supporter of the Ustachi 
regime calling for the extermination of 
Sarajevo’s Serbs and Jews (cf. V. Novak, 
Magnum Crimen: Pola vijeka klerikalizma 
u Hrvatskoj [Zagreb 1948]). Or, could 
paramilitary forces fired on the civilian pro-
testers who gathered in front of the parlia-
ment of Bosnia-Herzegovina to demand 
a peaceful solution to the severe state and 
interethnic crisis. As it was confirmed later, 
the incident was caused by Muslim military 
forces.
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Sarajevo have produced Vojislav Šešelj, 
a communist turned Serb extremist who 
threatened his hometown with destruc-
tion during the last war. Finally, could 
Sarajevo have produced Alija Izetbegović, 
a tacit supporter of the fundamentalist 
Young Muslims (Mladi muslimani) dur-
ing the Second World War and a lifelong 
advocate of an Islamic state? In his Islamic 
Declaration, used as his electoral manifes-
to in 1990, Izetbegović wrote: “The first 
and foremost conclusion is certainly the 
incompatibility between Islam and non-
Islamic systems. There can be no peace or 
coexistence between the Islamic faith and 
non-Islamic social and political institu-
tions… By claiming the right to organize 
its world by itself, Islam clearly denies the 
right of action on its soil to any alien ide-
ology. There is no secular principle, then, 
and the state should be an expression and 
supporter of the moral concepts of reli-
gion” (A. Izetbegović, The Islamic Decla-
ration: A Programme of the Islamization 
of Muslims and Muslim peoples [Sarajevo 
1990], 78 p.; cf. also his other pamphlet 
with similar threathening messages, Islam 
between East and West [Sarajevo 1988]).
All these political figures were prod-
ucts of Sarajevo’s intellectual clime at 
different times. What they had in com-
mon was their powerful influence on the 
public. Had Sarajevo really been a society 
committed to protecting each individual, 
would it not have been able to curb the 
activity of such harmful individuals in an 
organized way? None of these questions 
is answered by Robert Donia. In a simpli-
fied black-and-white perspective, Donia 
puts all blame for the suffering of the citi-
zens of Sarajevo during the latest civil war 
on Serbian nationalists round the Serbian 
Democratic Party (SDS), without so 
much as mentioning the crimes against 
the Serbs of Sarajevo or other crimes per-
petrated by Muslim forces across Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and in doing so, he makes 
use of information that have remained 
controversial until this day.4 This too sug-
gests that the purpose of this biography 
of Sarajevo is political rather than schol-
arly: it calls for revising the 1995 Dayton 
Agreement in line with a unitary Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, purportedly the only 
state model capable of sustaining the 
traditional cultural diversity of Bosnian 
society.
4 Donia presents as fact that the Army of 
Republika Srpska fired grenades on the 
queue for bread on Vase Miskina St, kill-
ing several people, and that Serbs killed a 
number of people at the Markale market. 
To judge from many reports by observers, 
however, there is no conclusive evidence as 
to the culprit in either tragic event.
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The Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts, more specifically its Department of 
Historical Sciences and the Committee 
for Compilation and Publication of Doc-
umentary Material on Foreign Policy of 
Serbia 1903–1914, have started in 1972 
a project of systematic compilation of rel-
evant material of diplomatic and political 
significance, and publication has begun 
in 1980. Projects of that kind require sys-
tematic and painstaking search through 
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